IIENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE"
Holmes Rolston, III
Colorado State University
nvironmental Justice is a welcome addition
to the rapidly growing literature in environmental ethics. Two dozen titles are
currently in print or in press, and this
book will hold its own in that vigorous discussion.
Peter S. Wenz is Associate Professor of Philosophy
and Legal Studies at Sangaman State University,
Springfield, Illinois. His background in law as well
as philosophy shapes his approach, which is from
the perspective of justice. "Environmental Justice is
primarily about theories of distributive justice, theories concerning the manner in which benefits and
burdens should be allocated when there is a
scarcity of benefits (relative to people's wants or
needs) and a surfeit of burdens" (pp. xi-xii). "The
present book is largely devoted to examining competing principles of distributive justice as they are,
or may be used to make environmentally focused
decisions" (p. 24).
Wenz finds environmental justice of critical
importance, both practically and theoretically. "I
have argued that we live in an extremely unjust
world" (p. 338). "From the environmental
environ men tal justice
perspective, the world is a mess" (p. 339). In his
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search for justice, Wenz surveys available theories
and tests them against cases real and imagined. He
particularly dislikes "the virtue theory" (Chapter
3), more cause than cure of, injustice. Justice
requires that persons get what they deserve, and
this theory holds that this is regularly now happening. The rich are getting what they deserve,
the poor what they deserve. The virtue theory "is
not rationally defensible" (p. 126), and Wenz is
perplexed that nevertheless many persons hold it.
Certainly no one will argue that this theory is
the whole truth. Many of the rich are dishonest, or
live on inherited wealth (assuming inherited
wealth is undeserved), or have their fortunes by
luck. Poverty sometimes is, and sometimes is not,
the fault of those who are poor. The determinants
of both wealth and poverty are complex. No one is
an island, every laborer builds on the labors of
others and suffers misfortunes at the hands of still
others. But Wenz cannot seem to find even a half
truth in the virtue theory, though he later agrees
with Rawls that persons in the original position
will agree that "the inequality of wealth in society
is required as a spur to productivity" (p. 241).
Wenz holds that "people (in Western societies, at
any rate) are largely motivated by the prospect of
personal material gain. Their hard work can be
more reliably solicited by the prospect of personal
ownership of property than by most other
rewards" (p. 331). So far as that works, it would
seem the virtue theory is partially true; those with
property have it as a reward of work. What follows
about whether and how far the deservedly (or
undeservedly) wealthy ought by duty of justice or
benevolence to share their wealth with the poor,
whether faulty or innocent, is a question that
requires more analysis.
Continuing his critique of theories of justice,
Wenz in successive chapters moves through libertarian theory, laissez faire economics, efficiency
theory, human rights, animal rights, utilitarian
theory, cost-benefit analysis, and Rawls' theory of
justice. Most are found promising at points; all are
found wanting as comprehensive theory.
Following Tom Regan, Wenz defends animal
rights, holding "that all subjects-of-a-life, human
and nonhuman alike, have rights, or at least that
we have obligations toward them" (p. 147). But
there is asymmetry between human rights and
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animal rights. Humans have a right to be rescued
from wolves; wild sheep do not; humans have a
right to decent housing; wolves do not. Humans
with broken legs have a right to medical
treatment; ducks with broken wings do not.
Positive rights are rights to be helped; negative
rights are rights to noninterference, rights to be
left alone (p. 110). When humans deal with other
humans, all humans have both negative and positive rights of equal strength (though see later).
Animals do not have any negative (much less positive) rights when dealing with each other; animals
do not have any positive rights when humans deal
with them. "The righ ts of wild animals are entirely
negative" (p. 152).
All the theories explored can in combination to
some extent repair each other's defects, but they
are all simultaneously defective in what they are
able to count morally - only humans and higher
sentient animals. The theories are "insufficient
even in combination with one another because
none justifies direct concern for plants... , plant
species, animal species, mountain streams, oceans,
and wilderness areas" (p. 271). Before venturing
into the more difficult territory of theories that
have such focus, Wenz pauses to regather perspective. In a chapter about methods in ethical
inquiry, he softens the objectivity in science and
insists on hard ethical argument, thereby to conclude that "the basic structure of ethical inquiry is
identical to that in science." "Conclusions about
environmental justice can be as objective and
certain as conclusions in any other area of environmental studies" (p. 254).
Reassured, Wenz presses on to appraise ethical
theories that are more distinctively environmental:
biocentric individualism and ecocentric holism.
Although an ethic concerning the environment
has been at issue since the start, not until Chapter
13, four-fifths of the way through the book, do we
directly ask questions of environmen tal ethics.
Earlier, the questions have been about how to distribute among humans the benefits and burdens
associated with the environment, or about the
rights and goods of higher animals in their environments, but not about flora, fauna, and natural
history in toto.
Biocentric individualism comes in two forms.
Egalitarian individualism holds that every living
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thing has the same inherent worth. Nonegalitarian
individualism holds that every living thing has some,
though not necessarily the same inherent worth (p.
273). The fIrst form requires too much of us; if all
inherentt worth, I
living organisms have equal inheren
cannot take antibiotics to kill millions of bacteria to
speed my recovery from pneumonia (p. 284).
"Biocentric egalitarianism is so confIning that even
[Paul] Taylor, its foremost proponent, refuses to
apply it consistently" (p. 287). The nonegalitarian
form requires too little. It posits infInitesimal
amounts of inherent worth in microorganisms and
mosquitoes; this worth, though present, is easily
overridden by human interests (pp. 291-92). Wenz's
critique of Taylor's principle ofrestitution (pp. 287292) is a fIne example of the many careful arguments throughout these sections.
Wenz fInds that ecocentric holism has much
more merit than biocentric individualism, though it
too fails as comprehensive theory. "The processes
of biological evolution which result in increasing
biotic diversity are among the good things of which
we must take account" (p. 304). These processes do
not have value inherently, for what they are in
themselves, they have value instrumentally (for
what they produce), but this is no ordinary instrumental value. One important difference is that
these instrumental processes are nonanthropocentric; they are instrumental to every living
organism. A still more signifIcant difference is that
with evolutionary processes "means and ends are
connected essentially, not accidentally" (p. 306). In
human affairs the same end can be reached by
various means, but in natural history the processes
are essential for creating the products. The
products result from the outplay of the processes,
and value is smeared across the process-product distinction; it can no longer be parceled into instrumental-inherent sectors. "Logic alone dictates that
these processes be viewed to some extent as endsin-themselves" (p. 307). Wenz approaches here
what I have tried to call "systemic value.
value.""
At the close of the book Wenz presents his own
theory, which, he claims, integrates - or at least
plurally arranges - all the preceding theories: the
"Concen tric Circle Theory of Environmen tal
Justice" (p. 311). This theory does include everything that counts morally, from humans through
sentient animals, plants, and ecosystems, and it also
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includes what is worthwhile in the various theories
of what and how to count morally, arranging both
objects and theories of moral concern in concen tric circles.
En route, Wenz distinguishes between a theory
of ethics and a theory ofjustice. A theory of ethics
asks what is of direct moral concern and how it is of
concern. A theory of justice asks what is a fair allocation of benefits
benefIts and burdens among those beings
who are of direct moral concern (p. 272). A theory
of justice is a subset of a theory of ethics, since
some moral questions are not about distributing
benefIts and costs. Nearing his conclusion, Wenz
might better have passed from the subdomain of
justice to the comprehensive territory of ethics;
nevertheless he wants to call the global theory the
"Concentric Circle of Environmental Justice." I
would have called it a theory of Environmental
Ethics. Much of the behavior enjoined cannot be
adequately thought of as distributing costs and benefIts fairly. Wenz's background in law, which often
serves him well, may also tempt him to stretch the
concept ofjustice into regions where it ceases to be
the best category. Even in interhuman ethics the
question of "getting fair shares of what is scarce" (p.
22) is not always the root moral question, for
example in censuring adultery.
When humans deal with plants, endangered
species, ecosystems, wildernesses, mountains, rivers,
or wildlife, justice is not the most useful category. If
one presses the etymology of the term far enough,
justice is doing what is right, and so the term could
be insisted upon. Nevertheless, justice in current
use is so entwined with courts of law, with issues of
fair distribution of benefIts and burdens among·
humans (as Wenz rightly claims), that one is better
advised to employ the more comprehensive term,
ethics, and to speak of protecting values and goods,
of appropriate respect and behavior.
first at least,
Another legacy is that Wenz sees, at fIrst
everything through a distributive justice fIlter. He
characteristically pictures actors desiring to maximize their benefIts and minimize their costs, interacting with others who are doing the same. Nothing
is said of benevolence or of love as springs of
ethical action. Love might be the better category
for dealing with adultery, for instance. And humans
can love nature as well as other humans.
Appropriate respect for the lives ofjumping spiders
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or coyotes is a matter of delighting in alien forms
of life, recognizing what Wenz calls their inherent
value - not an issue of fair distribution of benefits
and burdens.
Morality is not finally a matter of each agent's
seeking to enjoy as much benefit as possible and to
avoid as much cost as possible, being fair in so
doing. We do want to do that, of course, but that is
only enlightened prudence. Wenz begins with and
often returns to an episode when in childhood he
shared a pizza with a friend. One cut it in half and
the other chose first. The moral model reached in
that childish outlook is only the early stages of
moral development. As Wenz admits (p. 6), when
humans negotiate each to protect his or her own
self-interest with a fair distribution of benefits and
burdens, we are only being prudential and not yet
moral. It is not until the later portions of the book,
after the category of justice ceases to be central,
that we reach deeper moral territory.
Hiking a wildland trail, I leave the flowers for
others to enjoy, hoping that they will do the same
for me. I think this is fair, and we can all enjoy the
flowers. It is a fair distribution of benefits. Later,
shifting my ethical focus, I let the flowers live out of
respect for what they inherently are - whether or
not any humans should ever again pass that way.
Love, not justice, seems the richer category for the
maturing ethic. If one insists, the term justice can
again be forced to serve. "Justice is done when
people get what they deserve or what is due to
them" (p. 22). Adapting the term to flowers, nonnon
humans, having no merit, have no just desserts, but
possibly flowers have something due: appropriate
respect. Flowers get their poetic justice! But this is
forcing words to do unfamiliar work.
In Wenz's discussion of development versus the
preservation of parklands, one side wants to
develop and thereby "to maximize recreation in
the stunningly beautiful settings." The other side
prefers preservation, so that they and persons in
the future may "enjoy the lands ... in their natural
state" (p. 25). The issue is treated as a fair distridistri
bution of scarce recreation benefits. No doubt
these elements are present in such decisions, but
there is a deeper environmental ethics nowhere
reached in such discussion, one that Wenz himself
reaches only late in the book. The preservationist
may further be seeking appropriate respect for
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natural systems, especially relict wildlands, which
humans can learn to enjoy but should respect
whether or not they are maximizing recreation
benefits.
An environmental ethics needs a theory for
people - influential people like David Brower,
AIdo Leopold, Rachel Carson, or those who forged
the Wilderness and Endangered Species Acts -
who act on behalf of plants, animals, and places
and are not driven to maximize their personal
benefits, or even humanistic benefits. When Peter
Singer or Tom Regan defend the rights of animals,
they are driven by love as well as by a sense of the
just distribution of costs and benefits. Much
environmental concern, often that on the cutting
edge, is distorted when seen through the filter of
distributive justice.
Wenz's analytical work evaluating the insights
and inadequacies of various ethical theories
occupies most of his book (Chapters 1-13). But this
is preface to his synthetic model, the concentric
circle theory (Chapter 14), which is the most crecre
ative part of the book. Richard Sylvan, Val
Plumwood, Baird Callicott, and perhaps Peter
Singer have earlier suggested models of this kind,
but Wenz's model is the most elaborated.! It is
more self-consciously "pluralist" (p. xii). While
Sylvan, Plumwood, and Callicott do not much
dwell on their pluralism, being more interested in
integrated theory, this is the third recent book
especially to advocate pluralism in environmental
ethics. Christopher Stone's Earth and Other Ethics'l.
makes moral pluralism his central theme,
inveighing against moral monism. Andrew
Brennan's Thinking About Nature: An Investigation of
Nature, Value and Ecolog;jl insists on ethical polymorpolymor
phism. Wenz is more alert than are Stone and
Brennan to the danger of pluralism: an "unprin"unprin
cipled alternation between theories." "We need a
principled justification for preferring the dictates
of one theory in one situation and the dictates of
another theory in a different situation" (p. 313). It
is too much to expect that the vanous theories can
be derived from a single master principle, but we
will need - if we can find one - some theory that
decides executive control when theories compete.
Even while we yet grope for executive theory,
Wenz encourages us to proceed undaunted. We
can operate with "good judgment" (p. 315), analo-
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I turn now to the content of the synthetic
theory. Who is at the center of the series of circles?
The individual moral agent. Others of moral
concern are located on radiating circles by their
"closeness" to the moral agent at the focus.
"Closeness is defmed as the strength and number
of one's obligations to others" (p. 316). Who is in
the circles? In the innermost circles are humans,
who have rights, positive and negative, and who
have preferences they wish satisfied, who have
environmental goods to be defended and costs
they must bear. "People are thought of as existing
in concentric circles around me" (p. 317). They
are distributed near and far through moral ties,
linked with me by geography, family, employment,
or community. "As people are more remote from
us (our interactions with them are less involved)
we have diminished responsibilities for their
welfare" (p. 326). "Our obligations to people
concerning their positive human rights diminish as
those people are more remote from us" (p. 328).
However, rights at a distance have more pull
than mere preference satisfactions close by (p.
322). Location on the circles is related to positive
human rights but not to negative human rights (p.
325), which have the same strength throughout
the circles. This, I suppose, is consistent with
Wenz's earlier claim that "the reasons for believing
in the existence of positive and negative human
rights are of equal strength" (p. 123), if one understands that the reasons but not the rights are of
equal strength.
The outmost human-inhabited circle is that of
future generations (p. 332). This seems partly
right, although I might feel stronger ties to grandchildren yet unborn than to persons now living on
the other side of the world.
Still further out are circles inhabited by sentient
animals. Domestic animals may have positive
rights, but wild animals do not have any positive
rights at all. Again, negative rights keep their
... is that all subjects-of-a-life
strength. "The rule .,.
are equally entitled to relevant negative rights" (p.
328). This rule, however, is overridden more easily
with animals than with humans. Chimps and
humans have an equal right to life, but in a bind I
should rescue humans rather than chimps (p.
328). Humans and seals have an equal right to life;
still, Eskimos can hunt seals but not other humans

gously to the way scientists must evaluate competing theories without a calculus for doing so.
Stone and Brennan likewise hope to give' general
guidance for alternating between theories, trusting
the rest to rational argument in local contexts. I am
not sure that any of the three yet have the needed
principled justifications for what theory to prefer
when. If no standards can be formulated for what
Wenz calls "good judgment," this will often be little
more than a euphemism for "muddling through. "
Where it celebrates richness, pluralism can be a
virtue. Environmentalists often want to be holists.
They soon discover more complex levels of ethical
concern than in interhuman ethics. One will need
different theories, or subtheories, for dealing with
humans, future generations, animals, plants,
species, ecosystems. But pluralism can be extolled
as a virtue when it is tacitly a confession of ignorance and failure of nerve. One is confused by the
theories with all their pros and cons and can find
no way to decide among them. So one becomes a
pluralist and calls it riches - when in truth one
lacks what is most needed: an integrated theory.
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overrode concern for the goats. It is hard to see
how Wenz's circles would handle this case. Since
the goats were degrading the ecosystem, as well as
endangering rare plant species, perhaps Wenz
would remove them on this account.
Wenz embraces all with an ecological holism. At
the outermost concentric circle, we would think of
"evolutionary processes as 'inhabiting' a relatively
remote circle of moral concern" (p. 329). In this
circle we operate with the "principle of processharm" (p. 300), which forbids us to harm evolutionary and ecosysternic processes. Although this is
the most remote circle from the moral agent, Wenz
assures us that this does not mean that human or
animal goods routinely override these system-wide
processes.
Much of Wenz's analysis turns on the varying
strengths of rights over the domains of the inner
concentric circles that persons and sentient animals
occupy. These circles are the domain of rights
theory, as well as domains inhabited by persons and
sentient animals. Where does utilitarian theory
operate? Presumably over the same domain,
coming into play after rights theory has done its
job. Once we have satisfied rights criteria, we thereafter invoke utilitarian theory for further decisionmaking. Remembering all the theories surveyed in
earlier chapters, now promised to be integrated
into the concentric circle theory, we will sometimes
need efficiency theory or cost benefit analysis, or
Rawls's concept of justice. Wenz has a discussion of
how efficiency limits property rights, but we are not
told much further about when and how to use
which theories. That is a matter of what Wenz terms
"good judgment" (p. 315), which is what we use
when we have no theory to help us choose.
Since my Self is at the center of my concentric
circles, your Self at your center, and his Self at his,
and since we have different careers, locations in the
world, family ties, and so on, the strengths of our
ties will differ. Each carries about a personal set of
concentric circles - so far as humans are placed
therein at least, and perhaps animal ties, too, differ
in strength with the biographies of the central
agents. My judgments will not be your judgments.
Could this mean that at the same event in Earth
history, intersected differently by our concentric
frameworks, I operate pulled by positive rights
theory while you feel no such pull but operate with

(p. 327). It seems then, in effect, that animals do
have reduced negative rights in these circles
further out.
One problem is that there is .little guidance for
what animals get located where in the circles of
sentient life. Since the capacity for experience (the
degree to which an animal is a subject-of-a-life)
varies widely, one might expect this to affect their
locations. If fish are less intensively subjects-of-a-life
than are seals, fishing might be recommended to
the Eskimos over seal hunting. Or, other things
being equal, one might prefer an experiment on
rodents over one on chimpanzees. The strengths of
obligations within the human circles is determined
by biographical details; one has obligations to a
brother that he does not to a distant Ethiopian. Is
there any analogue with animals? Does one have
more obligations to endangered grizzlies in one's
home state than to elephants in Kenya? If there are
graded strengths of obligation in these areas, we
hear nothing about it.
One might have expected plants to show up next
in the widening circles, perhaps species after that,
and last ecosystems. But Wenz jumps from circles
of sentient animals to ecosystems in the outmost
circle. Earlier, he has generally been careful to say
that inherent value attaches to plants and species,
and he does not think plants or species unimportant (Chapter 13). His trouble, apparently, is
that he finds no available theories about how to
handle either. Individualist biocentrism is of little
practical use in dealing with plants. Although "we
have direct duties to protect and preserve species"
(p. 296), Wenz has no theory that locates them
appropriately in the concentric circles. As a result,
the model inadequately addresses endangered
species.
Rarity might make more difference in an environmental ethic than "closeness." We might prefer
plants at the species level to sentient animals at the
individual level. On San Clemente Island, the V.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and the California
Department of Fish and Game asked the V.S. Navy
to shoot 2000 feral goats to save three endangered
plant species. In the resulting dispute, including a
lawsuit on behalf of the goats by The Fund for
Animals, the Court ordered the goats removed
from the island. Some goats were trapped and
removed, others killed. Concern for the plants
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Notes

utilitarian theory? Sam operates on the basis of negative rights; Susan, located so that the countervailing rights claims are in equilibrium, operates
with cost/benefit analysis. Could this be like the
politician in Christopher Stone's Earth and Other
Ethics, who operates with his family using rights
theory and with his constituency as a utilitarian?
Wenz is right that the strengths of our personal
ethical obligations (though perhaps not our ethical
criteria) differ with our biographies. But when the
concentric circles are simultaneously biographically
and biologically formed, some boundaries determined by natural kinds, some boundaries determined by personal histories, the result is no clear
decision rules for persons jointly making contested
decisions. Environmental ethics mostly reverts to
muddling through, alternately known as good
judgment.
Wenz argues well. His book is clear and engagingly written, reminding me of the style of John
Hospers. He successfully illustrates the good
judgment in which he trusts, even when we grope
for arguments. One important feature is his use of
legal examples, which add relevance. Philosophers
will enjoy the debate even when others may think
Wenz has become irrelevant, e.g., thought experiments computing utility on a metric system of winsomes (1000 = one wholesome) and irksomes (1000
= 1 gruesome) (p. 156, p. 182), applied in imagination to .5 billion possible people (distinct from
future people) in India in generations to corne only to conclude that no such calculations can really
be performed anyway. So what was accomplished by
thinking through what is actually quite impossible?
Wenz can have a strong sense of urgency and relevance, but, in other moods, sometimes one gets the
impression that Wenz just enjoys argument. He
"likes clever paradoxes" (p. 227). In result, the
reader has to be prepared for full-scale, detailed
argument, mixed with concrete ethical injunctions.
There is little here that is terse or compact, though
often in the midst of heavy argument, there is cornie
relief. He first greets utilitarian theory as the "best
thing since indoor plumbing" (p. 181).
In sum, this is a major work in the field, and the
criticisms I register are evidence that I found it
thought-provoking. Environmental philosophy is
alive and well.

1 Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood develop "an annular
picture ... with nested zones." Richard and Val Routley (now
Sylvan and Plumwood), "Human Chauvinism and
Environmental Ethics," in Environmental Philosophy, eds. D.S.
Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley (Canberra:
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Australian National University, 1980), pp. 96-189 (on pp. 107Cal1icott integrates classical ethics and environmental
108). Callicott
ethics with a "tree ring" model with "inner social circles" and
animals, plants, and a "land ethic" in circles further out.]. Baird
Ethic," in
Callicott, 'The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic,"
Cal1icott (Madison:
Companion to a Sand County Almanac, ed. Callicott
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 186-217 (on pp. 207208). He uses "the image of annular tree rings in which social
structures and their correlative ethics are nested in a graded, differential system" with the '1and ethic" the most comprehensive
circle. J. Baird Callicott, "The Search for an Environmental
Ethic," in Matters ofLife and Death, 2nd ed., ed. Tom Regan (New
York: Random House, 1986), pp. 381-424 (on pp. 410-411).
Peter Singer pictures ethics as "an expanding circle." Peter
Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (New York:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1982). Unfortunately, Wenz does not
relate his work to these previous efforts.
2 Christopher Stone, Earth and Other Ethics (New York: Harper
and Row, 1987).
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